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SPEED TRAPS AND THE USE OF AIRPLANES
By MICHAEL L. MURPHY*
C ALIFORNIA is unique in that it prohibits the use of speed traps
to obtain evidence1 as to the speed of any vehicle for the purpose of
an arrest or prosecution under its vehicle code.! The California law
on this subject is divided into five parts, each of which serves a differ-
ent function.3 It should be noted, however, that the law does not pro-
hibit speed traps per se,4 although comments to that effect can be
found.5 Rather it prohibits their use for a certain purpose.6
The Speed Trap Law and Its Development
The speed trap law was first considered in Fleming v. Superior
Court' in which the Supreme Court of California upheld its validity
and announced the purpose for which it was passed. It stated that the
legislature intended to bring traffic officers out into the open so that
their presence would be felt by the motorist and thereby impress upon
him the fact that he is under a duty to drive carefully and obey all
of the rules of the road.8 While no mention of it was made in Fleming,
it is obvious that the legislature was motivated in part by a desire to
remove the "evils attendant upon the use of speed traps."' Prior to
* Member, Second Year Class.
'Only four states have enacted speed trap laws. See MD. ANNo. CODE GEN. LAws, Art.
66Y, § 213 (1957) ; ORE. REv. CODE § 483.112 (1961) ; TEX. PEN. CODE, Art. 803a (1961);
WASH. REv. CODE § 46.48.120 (1961).
2 CAL. VEIL CODE § 40801.
' Section 40801 prohibits the use of a speed trap for the above purpose; section 40802
defines what is meant by a speed trap; section 40803 provides that evidence obtained by the
"maintenance or use" of speed trap shall not be admitted into court; section 40804 makes
incompetent as a witness "any officer or other person" if his testimony is based upon the
"maintenance or use" of a speed trap; and section 40805 takes away the jurisdiction of any
court to make a conviction upon evidence or testimony "which is inadmissible under this
article."
' See Fleming v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 344, 348, 238 Pac. 88, 88-89 (1925); 14 CALIF.
L. Rav. 142 (1925-1926).
'See In re Beamer, 133 Cal. App. 2d 63, 67, 283 P.2d 356, 359 (1955).
'See Fleming v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. 344, 348, 238 Pac. 88, 88-89 (1925); 14 CALIF.
L. REv. 142 (1925-1926).
' 196 Cal. 344, 238 Pac. 88 (1925).
8 Id. at 348-49, 238 Pac. at 89-90.
'See People v. Beamer, 130 CaL App. 2d Supp. 874, 879, 279 P.2d 205, 208 (App. Dep't,
Super. Ct., Alameda, 1955) (dissenting opinion). See also In re Beamer, 133 Cal. App. 2d 63,
68, 283 P.2d 356, 359-60 (1955) ; 43 CALIF. L. REv. 710, 711 (1955) ; Comment, 4 So. CAL. L.
REV. 220, 221 (1930-1931) ; 14 CALIF. L REv. 142, 143 (1925-1926).
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1923, when the law was enacted, a rather dubious practice had de-
veloped in some communities whereby the local constable, or his
equivalent, would mark off a section of the highway, lie in wait, then
"clock" the unwary motorist as he drove by.'0 If it was found that
he had exceeded the speed limit, he would be stopped, cited for speed-
ing, and fined. Often the fine would be exorbitant and wholly designed
to augment local revenue."
In People v. Beamer,12 decided thirty years later, the speed trap
law was considered in respect to the use of radar to measure speed.
This case marked the first time this issue had been presented to an
appellate court.13 In most of the cases prior to this one, the question
turned upon judicial notice of the machine or judicial notice of its
accuracy.1 Quoting from section 751 (b) of the California Vehicle
Code, 5 the court defined a speed trap as a particular section of the
highway, measured as to distance, the boundaries of which are marked,
designated, or otherwise determined, so that the speed of a vehicle can
be calculated by securing the time it takes the vehicle to travel the
known distance. 6 The court concluded that radar does not constitute
a speed trap because it measures speed "through space" without refer-
ence to any part of the highway. 7
This conclusion was met by a strong dissent in which it was said
that the highway must be taken to include the space immediately above
it.'" "In . . .light of this [majority] reasoning," the dissenting judge
argued, "the enterprising village constable need not even acquire a
radar device, but ... he might install a system of electric eyes just off
the highway. They in turn 'through space' could make and record all
of the observations necessary . . . ."" The dissenting judge concluded
that radar does fall within the definition of a speed trap and, there-
10 Ibid. See also Edward C. Fisher, Modern Traffic Law Enforcement, 36 NEB. L. REV. 258,
263 (1957), wherein one of the early speed traps is described in great detail.
" See 43 CALIF. L. REV. 710, 711 (1955). Two states have enacted statutes to prohibit
traffic officers from profiting from fines levied, thus illustrating the extent to which this prac-
tice was carried. See NEm MExico STAT. ANNO. § 64-22-16 (1953) and WIs. STAT. ANNO.
§ 85.83 (1957).
1- 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 874, 279 P.2d 205 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Alameda, 1955).
" See 29 So. CAL. L. RE,. 240 (1956). An unreported case is discussed in 19 MuNic. L. J.
71, 72 (1954).
1 See In re Beamer, 133 Cal. App. 2d 63, 68, 283 P.2d 356, 359 (1955). Cases are col-
lected in Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 469 (1956).
1 Now CAL. VEH. CODE § 40802.
10 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 877, 279 P.2d at 207.
17 Id. at 877-78, 279 P.2d at 207-08.
I0 1d. at 882-83, 279 P.2d at 210.
10 Ibid.
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fore, cannot be used to obtain the speed of a vehicle for the purpose
of a prosecution under the California Vehicle Code. 0
Read literally, the reasoning of the court does not appear particu-
larly convincing. Certainly the highway must be taken to include the
space immediately above it. If it were otherwise, the purpose for which
the law was passed could easily be defeated. But the court's opinion
was not written to be read literally. Radar consists of an ultra high fre-
quency transmitter and receiver through the operation of which a series
of radio waves are beamed down the street under surveillance. When
these waves come into contact with a solid object, such as a car, they
are bounced back to the receiver. The number of waves "bounced
back" are electronically counted and compared with the number of
waves transmitted. The difference is in direct proportion to the speed
of the object contacted, regardless of the direction in which it is mov-
ing." This is the context in which the majority opinion was written,
and this must be the context in which it is read. As a result, it is
readily seen that radar measures speed with reference to the number
of waves "bounced back" to it and not with reference to any part of
the highway upon which a vehicle may travel. The time it takes a
vehicle to move across a stretch of road is not a factor to be taken into
consideration. This seems to be what the court meant when it said
that radar measures speed "through space" and, therefore, is not a
speed trap as that term is defined in the California Vehicle Code.
One other aspect of Beamer should be noted. Appellant argued
that radar constitutes a speed trap, because it measures time and dis-
tance.2  This argument has little merit.24  Notwithstanding the ob-
servation made above, this contention must fail. It begs the question.
Speed necessarily involves the determination of time and distance, for
that is exactly the method by which it is computed. To put it mathe-
matically, speed equals distance divided by time. Without the deter-
mination of time and distance it would be impossible to speak in terms
of speed. Appellant assumes that which he must prove. As the court
pointed out, his "argument could be applied with equal force to the
2 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 881-82, 279 P.2d at 210.
2 1 Id. at 875-76, 279 P.2d at 206-07.
22 A Washington case, decided a year later, came to the same conclusion on similar reason-
ing. See State v. Ryan, 48 Wash. 2d 304, 293 P.2d 399 (1956). See also Edward C. Fisher,
Modern Trafic Law Enforcement, 36 NE. L REv. 258, 269 (1957) ; Carosell & Coombs, Radar
Evidence in the Courts, 32 DzcrA 323, 352 (1955) ; Comment, 30 WASH. L. REv. 49, 53 (1955).
2'2130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 877, 279 P.2d at 207.
2 Id. at 877-78, 279 P.2d at 207-08. See also In re Beamer, 133 Cal. App. 2d 63, 69, 283
P.2d 356, 360 (1955).
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speedometer .. . ."" But, according to the court, it is "too well estab-
lished for argument that the . . . speedometer . . . is not a speed
trap . , 2 6 While there is no authority for this proposition, it would
appear that it is firmly entrenched in judicial thinking27 and undoubt-
edly true.
Dissatisfied with the decision in People v. Beamer,2 s appellant re-
fused to pay his fine. Thereupon he was arrested and put in jail. He
then sued out a writ of habeas corpus to contest the propriety of his
conviction. 2 ' Disregarding the usual limitations in respect to review
upon a writ of habeas corpus, the district court of appeals took juris-
diction of the case. The court said that it did so "because of the public
importance of the question, and for the reason that this is the only way
the cause can be taken to an appellate court."3 It then proceeded to
affirm the decision in the prior case and disclose the status of the law
in California. According to the district court of appeals: "There is
nothing inherently wrong with 'speed trap' evidence, and many states,
in the absence of statute, permit its use. California has seen fit to pro-
hibit 'speed traps' of a certain defined kind, but only those 'speed traps'
coming within the definition are prohibited.""1 Thus the court limited
the application of the law. It then defined the kind of speed trap pro-
hibited and found that it has four characteristics: (1) a particular
section of the highway (2) measured as to distance (3) the boundaries
of which are marked, designated, or otherwise determined (4) so that
the speed of a vehicle can be calculated by securing the time it takes
the vehicle to travel the known distance.32 The court concluded: "If any
one of these elements is absent the device does not fall within the pro-
hibition of the section.
' 33
Undoubtedly this case was correctly decided upon the facts. Radar
does not appear to be a speed trap when it is used as it was here. The
method employed to measure Beamer's speed was open and "above
board" in every respect. All of the officers involved were dressed in
regulation uniform and the radar set was mounted on the back of a
police car which was clearly marked as such and parked in plain sight.
"5 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 877, 279 P.2d at 207.
2 Ibid.
" 130 Cal. App. 2d Supp. at 882, 279 P.2d at 210 (dissenting opinion). See also In re
Beamer, 133 Cal. App. 2d 63, 69, 283 P.2d 356, 360 (1955).
-8 130 CaL App. 2d Supp. 874, 279 P.2d 205 (App. Dep't, Super. Ct., Alameda, 1955).
" See 43 CALIF. L. REv. 710, footnote 1 (1955).
20 In re Beamer, 133 Cal. App. 2d 63, 64, 283 P.2d 356, 357 (1955).
21 Id. at 67, 283 P.2d at 359.
I2 d. at 68, 283 P.2d at 359.
2 2 Ibid.
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Little more could have been asked to make the operation more con-
spicuous.
But suppose that the facts were otherwise, i.e., that the officers in-
volved were not properly dressed and the police car was not properly
marked and parked where it could be seen. Would the district court
have reached the same conclusion? According to its opinion,"' it seems
that it would have, but that is questionable. Two alternatives must be
considered, both of which turn upon the interpretation of the purpose
for which the speed trap law was passed. If the law was passed to
eliminate the "evils attendant upon the use of speed traps," 5 then the
court might have reached the same conclusion. Under this interpreta-
tion, it appears that the law was passed to meet a particular contin-
gency and no more. This seems to have been the position taken by the
court. On the other hand, if the law was passed to bring traffic officers
into the open so that their presence would be felt by the motorist, it is
suggested that the court would have reached another conclusion. Under
this interpretation, the "evil" to be eliminated is not the method by
which speed laws were enforced, but the secret way in which it was
done.
Of the two alternatives considered, the latter seems preferable. In
the first place, this alternative represents the position taken by the
Supreme Court of California in Fleming. It found that the legislature
intended to make the motorist aware of the traffic officers and thereby
compel obedience to the law. In the second place, this alternative is
suggested by the language used in the law. In addition to prohibiting
the use of speed traps for a certain purpose, the law requires that every
officer wear a "full distinctive uniform" and use a motor vehicle painted
a "distinctive color."3" These words obviously import a desire to elimi-
nate the secret element in speed law enforcement. In the third place,
it is quite likely that the legislature was not aware of any speed trap
other than the one it defined and, therefore, it probably felt that it had
covered the field with its definition. In retrospect it can be seen that
it was mistaken, but that does not alter the motive with which it acted.
Whether this argument should be extended to permit any "visible"
method of speed law enforcement is a proposition open to question.
But such a rule would promote better traffic regulation, which appears
to be a factor taken into consideration by the court in the second
Beamer case. With all of this in mind, it is suggested (1) that the
" 133 Cal. App. 2d 63,283 P.2d 356 (1955).
" See 43 CAuF. L. REY. 710,712 (1955).
"° See CAL. VEr. CODE § 40804. Cf. CAL. VaR. CODE: § 40800.
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statutory definition of a speed trap be considered as one of the many
definitions possible, but not as the only definition and (2) that the
decision in the second Beamer case be limited to the facts upon which
it was decided.
Use of Airplanes to Measure Speed
Since 1959 the speed of motorists in California has been measured
from airplanes. 7 In view of the number of traffic fatalities in recent
years, resort to this means of speed law enforcement is not surprising.
In 1960, for example, 3,723 people died as a result of traffic accidents
in this state."
The process by which speed is measured from airplanes is rela-
tively simple and it closely resembles that of a patrol car or motorcycle
sent out to cruise the streets. A pilot is given a particular road to patrol,
which he does from an altitude of four to seven hundred feet. Ahead
of this road two signs are posted to indicate that it is patrolled by air-
plane. The pilot works this road in close conjunction with one or two
patrol cars. Their purpose is not to patrol the same road from the
ground, but to make contact with a violator detected from the air.
When the pilot sees a motorist he believes to be exceeding the
speed limit, he brings his airplane into one of three positions, each of
which is taken in the same direction as that being driven by the sus-
pected vehicle. He flies directly above the suspected vehicle, directly
behind it, or directly adjacent to it. The position preferred by the
California highway patrol, under whose direction this program is
carried out, is that directly adjacent to the suspected vehicle. From
this position the pilot lines up a part of his airplane with a part of the
car below. Usually a wing strut is brought in line with the back bumper
of the car. He then flies parallel to the suspected vehicle, "clocking" it.
This he does by means of an air speed indicator which is located on the
airplane's instrument panel and operates much like a speedometer.
", The material about the use of airplanes to measure speed was gathered in a taped inter-
view with Sergeant Edward A. Schumann, Technical Services Division, Planning and Research
Section, Fixed-Wing Aircraft Program, California Highway Patrol in Sacramento, California,
Oct. 8, 1962. See also Highways: Somebody Up There, 59 NEWSWEEK 28 (Jan. 29, 1962).
Compare the program in California with that in other states. See Lew L. Gourley, Flying High-
way Patrol, 69 FLYINc 27 (July 1961) (Nevada) ; Richard A. Myren, Evaluation of the
Measurement of Motor Vehicle Ground Speed from Aircraft, 52 J. CRum. L., C. & P.S. 213
(1961) (Indiana) ; Bob Hudson, Watch Out for the Sky Cops, 88 Am. MERCURY 50 (Mar.
1959) (Indiana) ; Edward C. Fisher, Modern Traffic Law Enforcement, 36 NEB. L. REv. 258.
260 (1957) (Nebraska) ; Hugh W. Scott, The Eyes of Oklahoma Are Upon You, 59 FLYIrNG 30
(Aug. 1956) (Oklahoma).
" 1962 WORLD ALMIANAc 304.
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The air speed indicator is calibrated in miles per hour and tells the
pilot his air speed in the absence of any wind. It does not tell him,
however, how fast the motorist below is driving. This he must obtain
by determining his head wind or tail wind, whichever the case may be,
then adjusting his indicated air speed accordingly. For example, if
the pilot discovers that he has a tail wind of five miles per hour, he
must add this amount to his indicated air speed in order to determine
the speed of the suspected vehicle. Similarly, if he discovers that he
has a head wind of five miles per hour, he must subtract this amount
from his indicated air speed. The pilot finds his head wind or tail
wind by the use of a stop watch. With reference to mile markers on
the ground, he calculates the time it takes him to fly between two or
more of them. The pilot then refers to a printed chart, which indicates
his speed. This he compares to the figure registered on his air speed
indicator and finds the difference. The difference is the extent of his
head wind or tail wind. It should be noted that the speed measured
by the use of the stop watch is that of the airplane and not that of the
suspected vehicle. For all practical purposes, there is no difference
between the two, and the one equals the other. In any case, if the pilot
ultimately determines that the motorist has been exceeding the speed
limit, he radios one of his patrol cars, describing the violator's car,
the direction in which it is moving, and the present location of the
vehicle. He then continues to watch the violator's car to verify that no
mistake is made in contact by the ground unit. After contact has been
made the violator is asked to step back to the patrol car where he can
hear the pilot relate the violation. One of the members of the ground
unit then points out the patrol aircraft to the violator, who is cited for
speeding or warned, whichever is deemed more appropriate.
The aircraft used by the California highway patrol is clearly
marked,, having the words "Highway Patrol" printed underneath the
wing and the insignia of that organization painted on both sides of the
fuselage. The color of the aircraft is either black and white or maroon
and white. The officers involved, including the pilot, are dressed in
regulation uniform.
From this description of the use of airplanes to measure speed, it
does not appear that it constitutes a speed trap as that term is used in
the California Vehicle Code. Adopting the definition offered in In re
Beamer 0 as the proper criterion, it can be seen that one of the neces-
sary elements is missing. No reference is made to a particular section
of the highway, so that the speed of a vehicle can be calculated by
" 133 Cal. App. 2d 63, 283 P.2d 356 (1955).
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computing the time it takes the vehicle to travel across it. To be sure,
there is a reference to a particular section of the highway which is
measured as to distance and marked by road signs; but that reference
is made in order to determine the amount of head wind or tail wind
the patrol aircraft has to encounter. But notwithstanding that,4" the
result is the same. The speed measured in any case is that of the air-
plane as it flies from sign to sign and not that of the suspected vehicle.
To argue that the two are equal is useless. They must be equal if one
is determined by reference to the other. To argue that these facts alone
are sufficient to bring into operation the prohibition of the statute is
no less futile. Even if it be assumed that an airplane is a motor ve-
hicle, as that term is used within the definition of a speed trap, it is
clear that the law was written with reference to the use of a section of
the road to measure the speed of the motorist's car, and not that of the
patrol vehicle.
This leaves but one more possibility to consider. Suppose that the
definition offered in In re Beamer 41 is rejected and that a speed trap is
defined to mean a method of enforcement characterized by a secret or
undisclosed measurement of speed. Would the result be any different?
It does not appear that it would. The program seems to be conducted
as openly as its nature will permit. Of course, that fact is not con-
clusive, but it should be sufficient under the circumstances. One argu-
ment otherwise could occur. It might be said that signs posted along
the highway warning motorists of the use of airplanes to patrol the
road do not compel obedience to the law as effectively as uniformed
officers visibly watching traffic and, therefore, the program must fall
within the definition of a speed trap. Notwithstanding the apparent
truth in this statement, the argument is likely to fail. In view of the
steps taken to comply with the law and the public policy in favor of
o There is some reason to doubt that reference is made to the mile markers to determine
the amount of head wind or tail wind the patrol aircraft has to encounter. For example, sup-
pose that the indicated air speed is seventy miles per hour. It may be remembered that this
figure does not represent the motorist's speed, for it does not take into account the force
exerted by the wind upon the patrol plane. To determine the amount of force so exerted, the
pilot calculates the time it takes him to fly from one mile marker to another, converts this
into speed, compares the figure thus obtained with that registered upon his air speed indicator,
and finds the difference. If the speed gathered by the use of the stop watch is seventy-five
miles per hour, the pilot knows that he has a tail wind of five miles per hour. He then adds
that figure on to the seventy miles per hour registered on his air speed indicator to find the
motorist's speed. But this final computation is unnecessary, for the figure ultimately reached
is the same as that obtained by the use of the stop watch alone. The result thus casts some
doubt upon the existence of the practice just described and suggests that the speed of the
motorist is actually determined by the use of the stop watch and nothing else.
" 133 Cal. App. 2d 63, 283 P.2d 356 (1955).
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strict traffic regulation, it is suggested that it is enough that the program
does not contravene the purpose for which the law was passed. It may
be admitted that the program's sponsors must take reasonable care to
see that the public is notified of the program's operation. But, in the
absence of any evidence that this has not been done, there is no reason
to hold that the use of airplanes to measure speed is a "speed trap"
as that term is used in the California Vehicle Code.
